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T
his book is the fourth installment in the officially sponsored history of the
International Monetary Fund. It begins where the previous installment ended,
shortly after the entry into force of the Second Amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund. It ends with the adoption of the Brady plan, which aimed
to resolve the debt crisis that dominated the work of the Fund for most of the
1980s, but before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made new and different
demands on the human and financial resources of the institution. 
Although this is an officially sponsored history, it is not a mere chronicle. In
fact, it is not even organized chronologically. In the first part, James Boughton
describes the Fund’s efforts to influence the policies of the major industrial coun-
tries. In the second part, he examines the Fund’s involvement in the debt crisis and
thus focuses on its relations with the middle-income developing countries of Latin
America. In the third part, Boughton discusses the Fund’s attempts to foster
growth-promoting reforms in low-income developing countries and provide those
countries with concessional financing. In the last part, he discusses the evolution
of the Fund as a financial institution, the changing role and attributes of the SDR,
the start of the move toward universal membership, the Fund’s relations with other
institutions, and changes in its organization and governance.
Previous volumes in this series were written when the Fund was obsessively
protective of its confidential relationship with its members. The authors of those vol-
umes, however, were given unrestricted access to the Fund’s archives and could
therefore provide outsiders with a window on the Fund’s decision-making processes.
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Board, papers prepared for the Board, and other documents in the Fund’s archives;
it did not provide references to individual documents but did quote Executive
Directors by name. The second and third volumes (de Vries, 1976, 1985) used the
same sources, subject to the same constraints, but exploited outside sources, includ-
ing the author’s interviews with many officials who had dealings with the Fund.
Those volumes also discussed important developments outside the Fund, such as the
work of the Group of Ten.1
In 1996, however, the Fund began opening its archives, and most of the docu-
ments on which Boughton relies are now available to outsiders or will be available
soon. Therefore, Boughton is able to cite individual documents and can also
devote less attention to the deliberations of the Executive Board, in order to say
more about the roles and views of the Managing Director and staff. Yet he tells us
more than we need to know about the chronology of negotiations between the
Fund and governments—the travels of staff missions and finance ministers—and
less than we need to know about the issues with which they were struggling.
Furthermore, he does not always explain why a Fund-supported program “went
off track”—a phrase he uses with maddening frequency. Nevertheless, Boughton
provides a thorough, thoughtful, and lively account of the Fund’s activities during
a turbulent decade. Most readers will probably want to skip some topics or case
studies, and Boughton makes that easy by offering frequent summaries of what
lies ahead. The patient reader, however, will be well rewarded. This thousand-page
book describes some remarkably interesting episodes.
I. An Overview
Boughton takes the title of his book from a passage in a speech by Michel
Camdessus, Managing Director of the Fund during the last part of the period cov-
ered by the book, in which Camdessus spoke of a “silent revolution” in many
developing countries. It is showing itself, he said, in the number of countries that
have sought the Fund’s help in devising growth-oriented adjustment programs.
But Boughton uses the phrase more broadly. There was, he writes, a shift “away
from tendencies toward autarky, insularity, mercantilism, and governmental plan-
ning and control over economic activity; and toward a common set of beliefs and
policies based on open international trade and finance, competitive pricing and
production decisions, and cooperation between countries.” This shift, he says,
reflected a basic change in economic philosophy “toward a new classical synthe-
sis in which government has an indirect role in, but not a direct responsibility for,
ensuring national economic prosperity; in which private economic activity is pro-
moted through good governance and the development of physical and social
infrastructure” (Boughton, p. 3).
Boughton’s book explores the consequences for the IMF—how the silent rev-
olution altered the Fund’s relations with the major industrial countries and how the
Fund sought to support it in developing countries. In its dealings with the industrial
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1This passage relies on Boughton’s description of those earlier volumes (Boughton, pp. xv–xvi).countries, no longer obliged to defend pegged exchange rates and thus less depen-
dent on IMF financing, the Fund had to struggle for influence. In its dealings with
the developing countries, it faced a different problem: how to reconcile the need for
painful adjustment and far-reaching reform with the need for weak national gov-
ernments to claim ownership of their Fund programs.
The book begins with a review of major developments in the world economy,
the international monetary system, and the IMF from the end of the 1970s to the start
of the 1990s. It also includes brief biographies of Jacques de Larosière and Michel
Camdessus, the Managing Directors who led the Fund during those years. The Fund,
says Boughton, faced serious internal weaknesses at the start of the 1980s:
The surge in lending to developing countries at the end of the 1970s had
come at the expense of maintaining the quality of adjustment programs and
of the Fund’s financial portfolio. The failure of the effort to establish a sub-
stitution account had weakened the potential for the SDR to play a central
role in the international monetary system and had deprived de Larosière of
the centerpiece of a strategy for strengthening the institution. The waning
of demand for the Fund’s resources by industrial countries, together with
the very limited consensus on whether and how to stabilize exchange rates,
left the Fund struggling to define a clear role for its core function, surveil-
lance. If the Fund was to remain the world’s premier monetary institution,
it would have to nurse its roots back to health or redefine its role. As the
decade progressed, it did enough of both to dominate the global economic
stage more than ever before (Boughton, p. 41).
Controversial premises lurk within this passage: that the quality of the Fund’s
financial portfolio had been impaired by the large volume of low-conditional lend-
ing in the 1970s; that surveillance over its members’policies could have given the
Fund significant leverage over those national policies so as to make surveillance
the “core function” of the Fund; that replacing dollar reserves with an SDR-
denominated asset—the aim of the substitution account—would have given the
SDR and, therefore, the Fund a “central role” in the international monetary sys-
tem. Boughton is right to say that the Fund played a more prominent role during
the 1980s than during previous decades. It did so, however, by redefining its role,
largely in response to the debt crisis, rather than performing the tasks defined by
the Second Amendment—overseeing its members’ exchange rate policies and
managing the growth of international reserves.
The Fund’s original Articles of Agreement embodied a remarkable degree of
agreement about the appropriate form and functioning of the postwar monetary
system. The Second Amendment, by contrast, was crafted in language designed to
conceal deep disagreements about the future functioning of the system, and they
were not resolved thereafter. They were instead compounded in the early 1980s by
deep disagreements among the industrial countries about economic policy in gen-
eral. Therefore, the Fund was unable to exercise any significant influence over
those countries’ policies. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed on SDR creation
by the Second Amendment and the collapse of the subsequent effort to devise a
substitution account kept the Fund from exercising any appreciable influence over
the evolution of international reserves.
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ened its scope in the attempt to foster growth-promoting adjustment. One is led
indeed to wonder whether the roles of financing and conditionality had been
reversed by the end of the 1980s. Originally, conditionality was viewed as a way
of making sure that the Fund would be repaid when it provided financing. During
the 1980s, by contrast, the provision of financing seemed increasingly to be
viewed as a way of promoting reform. In several cases, moreover, new money
from the Fund served merely to roll over the Fund’s existing claims rather than
provide additional financing. There is indeed an odd similarity between the Fund’s
efforts to mobilize commercial bank lending during the debt crisis and its own
concessional lending. The commercial banks’ loans to the middle-income coun-
tries served as a roundabout way to capitalize the banks’ interest-income claims;
the Fund’s concessional lending to the low-income countries served as a round-
about way to refinance the Fund’s own claims.
II. Surveillance and the Developed Countries
The first main part of Boughton’s book deals with surveillance and, in that con-
text, the Fund’s involvement in the affairs of the major industrial countries. It starts
with a chapter on the origins of surveillance, which reviews at length the efforts of
the Executive Board to develop guidelines for surveillance. Those efforts,
Boughton explains, were hugely complicated by basic disagreements produced by
the ambiguities built into the Second Amendment. Was the Fund supposed to dis-
courage its members from trying to manage floating exchange rates, or was it sup-
posed to encourage its members to pursue national policies aimed at achieving
exchange rate stability? The chapter also reviews the staff’s efforts to identify
equilibrium exchange rates and the evolution of its views about appropriate
exchange rate policies for the developing countries. It concludes with accounts of
two cases in which the Fund held special consultations with individual countries
because other countries had criticized their policies. In 1982, Sweden’s neighbors
accused it of devaluing the krone excessively; in 1987, the United States criticized
Korea for refusing to let the won appreciate and thus reduce its current-account
surplus. Boughton says that the Fund played a useful role in resolving these dis-
putes, although he concedes that its involvement had no obvious influence on
Swedish or Korean exchange rate policy.
Boughton turns next to the Fund’s surveillance of the major industrial coun-
tries and its formal role in those countries’ sporadic attempts at policy coordina-
tion and exchange rate management. The story is well told, but the Fund does not
play a very large part. In a footnote, indeed, Boughton reports that his interviews
with Group of Seven (G-7) officials failed to identify a single case in which a pol-
icy decision was influenced by the Fund’s advice (Boughton, p. 140). Much of his
account, moreover, is based on outside sources rather than Fund documents—
which is itself revealing. But he describes some interesting episodes involving the
Fund directly. Beginning in 1981, the staff and Executive Board began to criticize
the fiscal policy of the Reagan administration. In 1985, moreover, the staff
responded to a claim made by the Reagan administration that there was no causal
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Department attached a 140-page “supplementary note” to the draft of the World
Economic Outlook (WEO), which found that a cut in the budget deficit would
reduce real interest rates. But the U.S. authorities insisted that the note be omitted
from the published version of the WEO, and they also succeeded in blocking sug-
gestions that the note be published in some other form (Boughton, p. 145). 
Disagreements about U.S. exchange rate policy were “surprisingly mild”
compared with the sharp disagreements about U.S. fiscal policy. In its report on
the 1981 consultation with the United States, the staff supported the U.S.
Treasury’s announcement that it would no longer intervene on foreign exchange
markets. “It is readily apparent,” the staff said, “that a substantial degree of
exchange rate flexibility needs to be maintained in present circumstances” and that
information obtainable from the foreign exchange market should be used to guide
domestic policy. By 1983, however, when the dollar had begun to appreciate
strongly, the staff began to speak of the need for “orderly correction in the
exchange value of the dollar” (Boughton, pp. 150–1). 
While urging the United States to cut its budget deficit, the Fund was telling
Japan to slow the rapid pace at which it was reducing its deficit. The contrast,
Boughton says, reflected a judgment that the U.S. fiscal problem was far more
severe, both from a global standpoint and in relation to the large difference
between the two countries’savings rates. There was also a difference, however, in
the Fund’s views of the two countries’efforts to limit their reliance on fiscal poli-
cies for countercyclical stabilization. It told the United States to do precisely that,
but it told Japan to show more flexibility. This difference, Boughton says, is harder
to explain, as the Japanese economy had shown more resilience to negative
shocks. For the most part, however, the Fund’s consultations with Japan were
marked by “admiration and support for the authorities’conduct of growth-oriented
and financially stable policies” (Boughton, p. 154). Throughout the buildup of the
“bubble economy,” the Fund supported the Japanese policy stance. Even in 1989,
when inflation accelerated and the yen weakened, the staff found “no compelling
reason” for Japan to tighten its monetary policy (Boughton, p. 163).
There is another remarkable difference between the Fund’s views about two
industrial countries. Although the Fund did not disagree strongly with U.S.
exchange rate policy in the 1980s, it took frequent exception to U.K. policy. At the
start of the Thatcher era, Britain’s policy stance resembled the one adopted there-
after by the Reagan administration. Exchange rates were market prices and should
be market determined. The Fund’s staff did not disagree initially. Two years later,
however, it concluded that sterling should not be allowed to appreciate further, and
it began suggesting quietly that Britain might benefit from joining the exchange
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS) once the overvaluation
of the pound had been corrected. But the staff changed its mind again when Britain
came closer to taking that step; it concluded that Britain should wait until it had nar-
rowed the gap between British and German inflation rates (Boughton, pp. 182–3).
Turning to policy coordination among the major industrial countries,
Boughton explains how the Fund was brought into the process in 1982 and its sub-
sequent efforts to devise “objective indicators” as a framework for multilateral
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Summit in 1982, which made these commitments:
1. We accept a joint responsibility work for the greater stability of the
world monetary system. We recognize that this rests primarily on con-
vergence of policies ....
2. We attach major importance to the role of the IMF as a monetary author-
ity and we will give it our full support in its efforts to foster stability.
3. We are ready to strengthen our cooperation with the IMF in its work
of surveillance; and to develop this on a multilateral basis ....
4. We rule out the use of our exchange rates to gain unfair competitive
advantage.
5. We are ready, if necessary, to use intervention in exchange rates to
counter disorderly conditions, as provided for under Article IV of the
IMF Articles of Agreement. 
This declaration, Boughton says, was consistent with the U.S. view that
exchange rate stability depends on policy convergence, but it was also consistent
with the French view that exchange rate stability is important and requires a
mutual commitment to that goal. “That it was possible to draft a series of appar-
ently firm declarations that equally supported two diametrically opposed visions
is a remarkable tribute to the obfuscatory skills of the sherpas and their deputies”
(Boughton, p. 194). He should perhaps have wondered why those skills seem to
thrive in the neighborhood of Paris. The accord that paved the way for agreement
on text of the Second Amendment to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement was
reached at the Rambouillet Summit, seven years earlier. Its ultimate incarnation
was the strange phrase in the present text of Article IV, which commits the Fund’s
members to “promote a stable system of exchange rates.” No one has been able to
give operational meaning to that phrase, but the agreement to put the word “sta-
ble” in an unnatural place played a key role in defusing the conflict between
American and French views about the future of the monetary system. (See de
Vries, 1985, pp. 739–49.)
Finally, Boughton describes the Fund’s role in the episodic efforts at exchange
rate management—the Plaza Agreement of 1985 and Louvre Accord of 1987. He
does his best to emphasize the Fund’s involvement, but that is not easy. In fact, he
describes its role as peripheral. In January 1987, the G-5 deputies met in Zurich, and
the Fund’s representative participated in the deputies’ discussion of the objective
indicators drafted by the Fund. After that, however, he left the room so that the
deputies might discuss exchange rate policy. At the Louvre meeting itself,
Camdessus, the new Managing Director, submitted a note that dealt “more openly”
with exchange rates than had been customary, and his predecessor, de Larosière, hav-
ing replaced him as Governor of the Banque de France, took part in the subsequent
discussion of exchange rate policy. (He was, one participant said, “the ghost of the
IMF.”) Unfortunately, Boughton is unable to resolve the dispute that still surrounds
the substance of what was actually decided at the Louvre (Boughton, pp. 128–9).
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that the staff provided analytical support for the Fund’s efforts to influence
national policies, not only in the context of surveillance but in broader forums too.
He traces the evolution of the WEO from the 1960s, when it served as a back-
ground document for an informal discussion by the Executive Board, to the first
published version in 1980, and on to the current regime, semiannual publication,
in 1984. More importantly, he traces the evolution of the methodology used to pre-
pare the WEO.2 Buried in this chapter, however, is a four-page section that belongs
elsewhere. In fact, it deserves a chapter of its own. It begins this way:
The controversy that more than any other could be characterized as a bat-
tle for the heart and soul of the IMF was the debate over fixed versus
floating exchange rates. As with other economic issues, this debate took
place on two levels: the field, especially in the policy recommendations
given to countries requesting to borrow from the Fund, and at headquar-
ters, especially research and policy papers (Boughton, p. 247).
The discussion that follows, however, is disappointing. There is little here or
elsewhere about the course and consequences of the internal debate. Although
Boughton alludes to it often and in several contexts, he does not explain how it
impinged on the work of the Fund—whether and how it divided the staff, how it
affected the design of Fund-supported programs, and how it cropped up in the
Board. A visitor to the Fund in the 1980s and 1990s soon became aware of the
internal controversy. There were disagreements between departments about the
viability of the EMS and, thereafter, the feasibility of European monetary union,
and the various area departments seemed to hold quite different views about the
comparative merits of fixed and flexible exchange rates.3 Yet Boughton does not
discuss these matters. In fact, he says very little about debates within the staff,
making it seem like a monolith. 
III. The Debt Crisis
The second main part of Boughton’s book deals with the debt crisis. It begins with
a brief overview, which tracks the debt crisis back to its origins—the surge of bank
lending to developing countries after the first oil shock of 1973–74—and then out-
lines the evolution of the debt strategy orchestrated by the Fund after the crisis
erupted. Boughton describes that strategy briefly in the first chapter of his book:
The effects of the debt crisis were contained in the early 1980s through a
“case-by-case” strategy in which external financial support was provided to
countries willing to adjust their economic policies. That strategy succeeded
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2Nowhere in this discussion, however, does Boughton mention an odd aspect of the Fund’s method-
ology. The WEO employs a macroeconomic framework focused on the main determinants of output and
income. When designing adjustment programs, however, the staff uses a form of financial programming
based on the monetary framework developed by Polak (1957). 
3One wonders, for example, whether the difference in staff views about U.S. and U.K. exchange rate
policies, discussed above, reflected a difference between the views of the Western Hemisphere and European
Departments about the importance of exchange rate stability and about the efficacy of intervention.in preventing a series of defaults on sovereign debts, but it did not lead to an
early resumption of normal relations between debtors and creditors. A driv-
ing assumption in the development of the strategy, much debated in the sub-
sequent literature, was that such defaults could have led to multiple
bankruptcies of major commercial banks and possibly to a collapse of the
international banking system. The debt strategy also succeeded in greatly
reducing the payments deficits of many developing countries, but it did so
by forcing a reduction in imports rather than fostering growth in exports.
By 1985, a consensus was forming among officials in creditor countries that
new approaches were needed for a more favorable and more sustainable
solution to the crisis. The focus of the debt strategy during the next few
years was to encourage indebted countries to undertake growth-oriented
structural reforms financed largely by longer-term loans from the World
Bank and regional developing banks, and to encourage commercial banks
to resume net lending to countries undertaking such reforms. That effort
failed to generate either long-term growth or even much long-term financ-
ing, and by 1988, almost all of the countries hit by a debt crisis several years
earlier were still struggling to escape from it. For much of the developing
world, the 1980s were to be a “lost decade” for economic growth.
The denouement of the debt strategy arrived when the realization took
hold that a high-growth equilibrium could be attained only through debt
reduction. The debt-relief approach had two prongs: one aimed at the
low-income countries that owed most of their external debt to creditor
governments, and the other aimed at the middle-income countries that
were heavily indebted to commercial banks (Boughton, p. 31).
That same chapter, moreover, makes a point not stressed enough in
Boughton’s detailed account—that there was a huge drop in nonfuel commodity
prices in the 1980s. It can, he says, be called “the most severe decline in com-
modity prices in recorded history” and, for the low-income countries, the “most
devastating event of the decade” (Boughton, p. 24).
Elsewhere, Boughton notes that the debt crisis was not wholly unanticipated by
the Fund. In the spring of 1981, the WEO had provided a five-year projection of the
debt burdens of the oil-importing developing countries; it described them as “worri-
some” and warned that many countries “would soon find themselves unable to
finance their deficits” (quoted by Boughton, p. 234). In January 1982, moreover, sev-
eral months before the crisis, de Larosière had addressed a group of leading bankers
and urged them to insist that borrowing countries confront their economic problems
rather than use bank financing to postpone adjustment. He also urged the banks to
maintain or increase their exposure levels when countries adopted appropriate poli-
cies (Boughton, p. 268). Yet the sudden onset of the crisis was unanticipated.
The Onset of the Crisis
On August 12, 1982, Mexico’s finance minister, Jesús Silva Herzog, informed the
IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve that Mexico could not repay debt
coming due at the start of the following week. Kraft (1984) describes the event as
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ous problems in Mexico and of its need for large-scale borrowing. Four weeks
before the onset of the crisis, moreover, the Board had discussed the Mexican sit-
uation, and several Directors had expressed concern about the buildup of debt. But
no one had predicted the imminent cessation of new foreign lending. There was,
indeed, “an assumption—or a hope—that commercial financing would continue to
be available until the necessary policy adjustments could be made” (Boughton,
p. 288), and those adjustments could not be made until the end of the year, when
a new Mexican president would take office. Lending did not continue, however,
and Mexico’s reserves were too small to pay off its maturing debt. It had either to
default or seek immediate help. But the Mexican authorities had reason to hope for
immediate help because a default would threaten the solvency of major banks in
major countries. Angel Gurría, Mexico’s debt negotiator, put the point vividly:
We didn’t crawl to the international financial community as debtors seek-
ing relief through some minor adjustment that could be made backstage.
We walked in through the front door. We said we had a major problem
with a capital P. We didn’t say the problem was a particular debt. We said
it was everybody’s problem (quoted by Kraft, 1984, p. 3).
The Fund was prepared to help quickly, but Mexico had first to find a way of
avoiding default by making its interest payments and reaching agreement with its
bank creditors on a rescheduling of the maturing principal. 
After arduous negotiations, Mexico obtained emergency funding from the
United States and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), as well as a 90-
day rollover of maturing principal from its commercial bank creditors. But Mexico
had still to reach agreement with the Fund on an adjustment program before it
could obtain IMF financing, and the amount for which it could qualify would not
fully meet its needs. Hence, Mexico would have to borrow some US$5 billion of
“new money” from the banks. The Fund made it clear, moreover, that all of the
creditor banks would have to be involved. Meeting with the major banks, de
Larosière announced that he would not ask the Executive Board to approve the
planned drawing by Mexico unless each bank agreed to provide its pro rata share
of the US$5 billion. This was the birth of concerted lending—the insistence by the
Fund that commercial banks agree collectively and individually to provide enough
new lending to guarantee the full financing of a Fund-supported program. 
Having explained how the debt crisis erupted in Mexico and how the Fund
responded, Boughton goes on to explain how Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were
swept into the crisis. Those countries, he argues, were not the innocent victims of
contagion. They had serious homegrown problems. 
Argentina had introduced a new policy regime in 1978 aimed at reducing
inflation and stimulating growth. Its best-known feature was the tablita—a pre-
announced schedule governing the gradual depreciation of the Argentine peso.
The program reduced inflation, but not by enough to prevent a large real appreci-
ation. Hence, exports and output stagnated, capital formation collapsed, and the
balance of payments deteriorated sharply. Argentina became very heavily depen-
dent on loans from foreign banks. Thereafter, the budget deficit grew hugely,
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moreover, Argentina tried to seize the Falkland Islands, Britain and Argentina
froze each other’s financial assets, and other countries imposed economic sanc-
tions. Argentina could no longer service its external debt. The debt crisis thus
came to Latin America several months before the Mexican crisis. But the Mexican
crisis made it clear that Argentina could not expect to borrow again, even with a
speedy end to the unique problems caused by the Falklands War. Weeks after the
Mexican crisis, then, Argentina sought to draw on the Fund.
The problems produced by the war were not resolved quickly, and they hugely
complicated Argentina’s situation. Because it had barred all payments to British
banks, fancy footwork was required to stave off an Argentine default and arrange
a Fund-supported program. As in the Mexican case, moreover, new money would
be needed from the banks, and de Larosière insisted that the banks commit them-
selves before he would take the Argentine program to the Executive Board. When
the program was actually brought to the Board, some Directors questioned its via-
bility—whether, as one Director put it, the required adjustment effort “could
impose such a heavy burden on the government as to exclude the possibility of
complete observance” (quoted by Boughton, p. 334). Nevertheless, the program
was approved, and it seemed to be on track in early 1983.
Boughton also downplays contagion as the explanation for Brazil’s debt prob-
lem. It was due, he says, to the country’s “dependence on a global economy that
was no longer strong enough to generate the growth rate to which the country had
become accustomed, and a serious domestic imbalance manifested in a persis-
tently high inflation rate” (Boughton, p. 337). Yet Boughton himself finds no rea-
son to believe that Brazil’s situation was unmanageable, and contagion appears to
have played a larger role in the Brazilian case than the Argentine case. In fact, it
produced a stronger reaction from the foreign banks. Some of them threatened to
pull out completely. After an unfortunate three-month delay, due to the need to
await the outcome of a congressional election, Brazil was quick to reach agree-
ment with the IMF on an adjustment program and began negotiating with the com-
mercial banks. In the Brazilian case, however, de Larosière declined initially to
call for concerted lending, and it took a long time to wrap up the whole package.4
There were, in fact, two reasons for the delay. Soon after their initial agreement
with the Fund, the Brazilian authorities began to back away from it. In February
1983, they devalued the cruzeiro abruptly, although they had said initially that they
would not do so. In addition, some commercial banks were refusing to accept a key
component of the financing package—a commitment to maintain their interbank
credit lines—and de Larosière had finally to opt for a modified form of concerted
lending. As he could not persuade the banks to promise firmly that they would
restore their interbank lines, he settled for an informal assurance that the banks
would consider enlarging their new medium-term loan to Brazil to cover the financ-
ing gap that would be produced by the run-down of interbank claims. 
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4Boughton offers two explanations for de Larosière’s decision. At one point, he cites Brazil’s “eco-
nomic strength” (Boughton, p. 327). Elsewhere, he says that de Larosière preferred a voluntary agreement
between Brazil and the banks, but he does not say why (Boughton, p. 339). More problem arose thereafter. In the first three months of its IMF program,
Brazil breached the ceilings on domestic credit growth and the fiscal deficit, caus-
ing the Fund to bar the next scheduled drawing. In this instance, Boughton
explains why a Fund program went off track:
Without question, the authorities had undertaken a serious and substan-
tial adjustment effort, after the disastrous delay in the fall of 1982. The
trade surplus in the first half of 1983 was above target, and—aside from
the effect of inflation on the government’s domestic interest payments—
the fiscal accounts had also strengthened. To some extent, the program
targets may have been misconceived in the first place, owing to the very
poor quality of the data and to the quite different conceptions of the prob-
lem and the underlying economic model held by the Fund staff and the
authorities. To some extent, the implementation of the program was
weakened by the authorities’ conviction that inflation could not (indeed,
should not) be sharply reduced in the short term. And to some extent, the
management of the Fund overestimated the ability of the banks to deliver.
Even with the strongest adjustment effort, the program very likely would
have gone off track owing to delays in obtaining the promised financial
support from the banks (Boughton, pp. 344–5).
Boughton concludes this chapter with the Chilean case, which differed appre-
ciably from those of the three big countries. First, Chile had embarked on free-
market reforms a decade before the debt crisis. Second, its external debt was owed
mainly by Chilean banks, not by the government, with the result that Chile expe-
rienced a disastrous banking crisis. There was indeed a striking resemblance
between the Chilean crisis of 1982 and the Thai crisis of 1997. 
Chile began to experience serious problems well before the Mexican crisis.
The Chilean peso had been pegged to the dollar in 1979 with the aim of reducing
inflation. Although inflation fell thereafter, there was a large real appreciation of
the peso, as in the Argentine case, and the current account deficit widened hugely.
In mid-1982, the peso was devalued, but not by enough to stem capital flight, and
the peso was allowed to float on August 5, a week before the outbreak of the
Mexican crisis. Boughton describes the consequences in language resembling a
standard account of the 1997 Thai crisis. The continuing depreciation coincided
with crumbling domestic demand and put unbearable pressure on the weak bank-
ing system. Domestic firms had taken out U.S. dollar-denominated bank loans
while the peso was pegged, and they could not service them after it depreciated.
Therefore, the banks could not service their debts to foreign banks without bor-
rowing more dollars, and they could not continue to borrow after the Mexican cri-
sis erupted. Rather remarkably, Chile persuaded foreign banks not to run down
their claims on Chilean banks, but that did not suffice to stave off a banking crisis.
In January 1983, Chile declared a bank holiday, liquidated three major banks, and
intervened in the operations of five others.
The rest of the Chilean story resembles those told earlier about the three big
countries, with one interesting difference. When Chile breached the terms of its
initial IMF program, foreign banks became reluctant to put up new money or
reschedule old loans. Instead of replacing the IMF program, however, the Fund
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reach agreement with the foreign banks. The banks, in turn, asked that the Fund
promise to reactivate Chile’s IMF program if Chile adhered to the shadow pro-
gram, and de Larosière agreed to reinstate the program once the banks had reached
a firm agreement with Chile and had disbursed the first tranche of a new money
loan. In July 1983, a Fund mission found that Chile was meeting the terms of the
shadow program, the banks signed on to the loan agreement, and the Fund rein-
stated Chile’s original program.
Boughton devotes four more chapters to the debt crisis. The first describes the
time-buying effort at crisis containment in 1983–85. The second discusses the
Baker Plan of 1985–87, aimed at reviving growth in the debtor countries. The third
describes the shift to debt relief in 1987–89 and the implementation of the Brady
Plan. The fourth assesses the whole debt strategy. In each of the first three chap-
ters, moreover, Boughton combines his account of the evolving debt strategy with
an account of the way that the crisis played out in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
and of the Fund’s dealings with those countries. He does discuss events else-
where—how the Fund tried to apply “enhanced surveillance” to Yugoslavia, for
example, and how debt reduction came to Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The
three big countries, however, occupy much space and in a way that is doubly dis-
concerting. Each country’s story is told in installments, one in each chapter, mak-
ing the reader retrieve from memory the relevant bits of the previous installment,
and Boughton’s account of the Fund’s dealing with those three big countries inter-
rupts his account of the way in which the whole debt strategy evolved.
I cannot claim to know what Boughton should have done instead. Clearly, the
Fund’s dealings with Mexico deserve detailed treatment. Many innovations in the
debt strategy were worked out first for Mexico. That is true even of the debt relief
phase, although Mexico was not the first debtor to secure a Brady Bond deal.
There is less reason, however, for dwelling at similar length on Argentina and
Brazil and their various policy failures. A strong case can be made, moreover, for
saying more about some of the other debtor countries, including Peru, which uni-
laterally limited its debt-service payments to 10 percent of its foreign-exchange
earnings and thus ran up arrears to the Fund and to other creditors. Boughton tells
the Peruvian story in his chapter on arrears, where he departs from his usual prac-
tice of treating country cases as examples and tells the story of each country that
ran up arrears. Some of those stories deserve to be told, especially the story of the
Fund’s troubled and troubling relations with Zaïre during the Mobutu kleptocracy,
but they are half buried in the chapter on arrears.
Containing the Crisis: 1983–1985
Having described the onset of the debt crisis and its initial manifestations in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Boughton explains how the crisis was contained in
1983–85. This was a time-buying effort, aimed at restoring normal relations
between the debtor countries and their foreign creditors. By pursuing rigorous
adjustment policies, the debtors would be able to reduce their need for massive
amounts of new money and, equally important, induce their foreign creditors to
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the massive borrowing that had occurred in the decade after the first oil shock.
What was wanted and expected was a return to modest amounts of voluntary lend-
ing and, of course, a resumption of growth in the crisis-stricken countries, as it
would reduce the relative magnitude of their existing debts and of their debt-
service payments. The banks also needed time to strengthen their own balance
sheets, so as to protect themselves from any future breakdown of the debt strategy. 
Unfortunately, there was no growth in the crisis-stricken countries, and there
was therefore no reduction in the weight of the debt burden. In fact, the time-buying
strategy, involving as it did the de facto capitalization of the debtors’ interest pay-
ments, increased their debt burden. In 1982, the external debts of net-debtor devel-
oping countries totaled US$781 billion, of which US$390 billion was owed to
foreign banks; by 1988, the total had risen to US$1,162 billion, of which US$484
billion was owed to the banks.5 In the interim, however, the banks strengthened
their balance sheets, making way for the final phase of the debt strategy—the shift
to debt reduction in 1988.
During the time-buying phase, however, there were modifications in the initial
debt strategy. The first was the move to multiyear rescheduling agreements
(MYRAs). At the start of 1984, Wilfried Guth of Deutsche Bank suggested to de
Larosière that it was time to consider a longer-term approach to Mexico’s financ-
ing needs. Large amounts of Mexican debt would mature in 1985 and 1986 and
would have to be rescheduled. At first, Boughton writes, de Larosière was skepti-
cal, believing that the banks would be reluctant to make firm financial commit-
ments extending beyond the end date of Mexico’s IMF program. But he came up
with a way for the Fund to overcome the banks’ reluctance—a procedure that
came to be known as “enhanced surveillance,” under which the Fund would mon-
itor informally a country’s policies and performance, much as it would if the coun-
try had a conventional Fund-supported program. In June 1984, de Larosière
suggested that the banks consider a MYRA for Mexico, which looked at the time
to be moving toward an eventual resolution of its debt problem. He did not com-
mit the Fund to undertake enhanced surveillance; Mexico would have to decide
the form of the Fund’s future involvement.
The banks were divided initially. Some banks feared that debtor countries
such as Argentina might seek similar treatment although they had made much less
progress than Mexico. Other banks saw merit in enhanced surveillance, and their
view prevailed. The banks undertook to negotiate a MYRA for Mexico once
Mexico and the Fund had given operational meaning to the notion of enhanced
surveillance. The Mexican authorities did not want to negotiate a shadow program
like the one devised for Chile, as it would involve a formal review by the Executive
Board. They also had reservations about any arrangement that would breach the
confidentiality normally surrounding the Fund’s consultations with a member, and
the Fund’s staff had similar reservations. But that issue did not have to be resolved
immediately, because Mexico still had a Fund program in place. It was therefore
agreed that the Fund would conduct semiannual consultations with Mexico, that
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5International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (various issues).the Board would review the consultations, and that results of the review would be
transmitted to the banks in a manner not yet specified. The banks then began to
negotiate a MYRA with Mexico. It would cover nearly US$50 billion of debt,
including debt that was not due to mature until 1990. Maturities were lengthened,
the repayment schedule was smoothed, and interest rate spreads were reduced.6
During this period, moreover, the Fund began to back away from its insistence
on concerted lending, because it posed serious problems. First, “it gave the banks
a virtual veto over the approval and financing of adjustment programs” and they
sometimes insisted on significant changes in those programs, delaying approval
and implementation (Boughton, pp. 406–7). Second, concerted lending was inef-
fective in small-country cases, as the banks had little at stake. The Fund began to
rely instead on two fallback strategies: In some cases, it asked merely for an assur-
ance that the banks collectively had reached an agreement with a debtor country,
rather than insisting that a “critical mass” of individual banks subscribe formally
to the agreement before the Fund’s Board would approve a Fund program. In other
cases, the Board approved a program in principle but withheld disbursements until
other financing arrangements had been completed. These fallback strategies, how-
ever, had another defect. On several occasions, “final agreements with banks took
a year or more to conclude after the Fund arrangement was in place. Hence many
of the negotiated programs were underfinanced, and the countries were forced
either to intensify their policy adjustments or seek waivers and modifications to
the original terms” (Boughton, p. 404).
Trying to Revive Growth: 1985–1987
By 1985, it was clear that the debt strategy was not achieving all of its objectives.
The time-buying strategy had greatly reduced the risk of a systemic financial cri-
sis. First, the banks had built up liquid reserves against potential losses. By 1986,
indeed, banks in continental Europe had made loan-loss provisions averaging
more than 20 percent of their claims on developing countries with debt problems;
by 1987, moreover, U.S. banks had begun to provision heavily. Second, the banks
had begun to reduce their exposure to the heavily indebted countries, despite their
involvement in concerted lending and other commitments made in conjunction
with IMF programs. Net bank lending to those countries dropped sharply in 1985,
and it turned negative in 1986, by which time there was little new lending in con-
junction with Fund programs. Third, the banks had developed a secondary market




6The mechanics of enhanced surveillance were never worked out for Mexico, because it lapsed back
into crisis and had to enter into another conventional Fund program in 1986. Enhanced surveillance was
used in other cases, however, including the case of Yugoslavia, which Boughton reviews later. Judged by
the experience of the 1980s, he says, enhanced surveillance must be called a failure; in two of the three
early cases, it probably delayed the adoption of the stringent adjustment measures required by the coun-
tries’situations. He suggests, however, that the availability of the technique may have given confidence to
countries’creditors contemplating MYRAs, and he says that it was used more successfully in several sub-
sequent cases (Boughton, p. 436). Some debtor countries had also made progress. A few had been able to nego-
tiate MYRAs that stretched out and smoothed their amortization schedules, and
some were coming closer to external stability. In too many cases, however, they
had reduced their current-account deficits by import compression, not export
expansion. Hence, output and employment were not growing, but social unrest
was rising, especially in the less successful countries. A new initiative was needed.
There were, of course, two ways to go: abandoning the basic premise of the
initial strategy that debts must be repaid in full and espousing debt reduction; or
reaffirming the basic premise but providing more financing and refocusing adjust-
ment on structural reforms aimed at reviving growth. But there was not yet any
official support for outright debt relief, not even in the debtor countries. Some
debt-reducing schemes had already been devised, and there were occasional calls
for the debtor countries to unite in support of a common approach to limit their
debt-service payments.7 But the larger debtor countries showed no apparent inter-
est in debt reduction or in a so-called debtors’ cartel; the orthodox aim of restor-
ing normal market access was still viewed as the right way to go. Therefore, the
official community tried in 1985 to reinforce the initial strategy by providing more
financing and refocusing adjustment. That was the Baker Plan. Debt reduction did
not come until 1989. That was the Brady Plan. The fact that each plan bears the
name of a U.S. Secretary of the Treasury testifies to the obvious—that the debt
strategy could not be altered without the support of the United States. 
James Baker unveiled his plan at the Bank-Fund Annual Meeting in October
1985. It was designed to address the “lending fatigue” of the banks and the “adjust-
ment fatigue” of the debtors (Boughton, pp. 417–8). Large numbers of small banks
were resisting calls for new lending, and the practice of treating all banks equally
was delaying the completion of financing packages. Furthermore, the large banks
believed that they were having to shoulder too much of the burden relative to offi-
cial creditors. In the debtor countries, moreover, political leaders were finding it
increasingly hard to justify the need to run trade surpluses and use large amounts
of their countries’ export revenues to make interest payments to foreign creditors.
Finally, within the IMF, there was a growing belief that Fund programs should
include structural measures aimed at fostering growth, although that conviction was
tempered by two concerns—that the contribution of structural reform to economic
growth had not been clearly identified and that, in any case, structural reform was
the job of the World Bank and regional development banks, not the IMF. 
What did Baker propose? First, debtor countries should adopt “comprehensive
macroeconomic and structural policies” to promote growth and balance of pay-
ments adjustment and to reduce inflation. Second, the Fund should continue to
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7Boughton lists some of the debt-reducing schemes but implies that they did not begin to appear until
1986 (Boughton, p. 480). Most did not. But Felix Rohatyn and I both published plans in 1982. Our plans,
however, were premature. We had as yet no good reason to predict that the initial debt strategy would be
inadequate, nor did we allow sufficiently for the vulnerability of the major banks, which were not ready
to write down their claims, even by the relatively small amounts that we were proposing. Finally, we did
not yet have a convincing rationale for debt reduction—why it might stimulate growth. That had to await
the arrival of what Krugman (1989) called the Debt Relief Laffer Curve. On the history of my own pro-
posal, see Kenen (1990). On the attempts to form a debtors’ cartel, see Boughton, p. 479. play a central role “in conjunction with increased and more effective structural
adjustment lending” by the multilateral development banks. Third, commercial
banks should increase their lending in order to support comprehensive adjustment
programs. And Baker went on to quantify the second and third objectives. The
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank should raise their disburse-
ments to the principal debtor countries by about 50 percent, and commercial banks
should lend an additional US$20 billion over the next three years.
There were then long discussions in the Fund about implementation of the
Baker Plan and its implications for the IMF. The staff continued to express reser-
vations about embarking on efforts to foster growth-oriented adjustment, but the
Executive Board did not. It agreed that Fund-supported programs should include
supply-side measures to foster domestic saving and promote investment and that
the Fund should collaborate more closely with the multilateral development
banks.8 The commercial banks expressed reservations initially about the Baker
Plan but soon changed their tune. Their subsequent support, however, was based
on the belief that they would lend jointly with the World Bank and that their risks
would thus be covered by some sort of guarantee. When disabused of that belief,
their enthusiasm waned. Nevertheless, the plan went forward. 
Did the Baker Plan succeed? Boughton gives two answers. The multilateral
development banks came quite close to providing the required amounts of financ-
ing, but there is disagreement about the commercial banks’ performance. The
Fund’s staff found that the banks did not provide any net lending in 1986–88,
whereas one well-known outside study cited by Boughton found that they lent an
additional US$18 billion over the three-year period (Cline, 1995, p. 209). The
Fund’s figure, however, represented the net change in the banks’claims on the 15
debtor countries featured in the Baker Plan, whereas other studies, including the
one just cited, looked at lending flows. The difference between them is due largely
to the banks’debt-reducing operations—debt sales, swaps, write-downs, and buy-
backs.9 But Boughton concludes that the Baker Plan failed, in that the 15 countries
did not return to robust growth (Boughton, p. 429). 
Boughton goes on to discuss the Fund’s relations with the three big countries
during the years of the Baker Plan and describes their attempts to quell inflation:
the introduction by Mexico of the so-called pacto, under which wages were set by
tripartite agreements involving the government, unions, and employers and were
based on projected inflation rather than backward-looking indexation; the “het-
erodox” Cruzado Plan adopted by Brazil in 1986, which introduced a new cur-
rency tightly pegged to the dollar and imposed a temporary price freeze and looser
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8Later, however, the Board had second thoughts. Although it endorsed the inclusion of structural
reforms in adjustment programs, it stopped short of instructing the staff to insist on them. The Board
believed that many Fund programs were failing because they overemphasized demand restraint, but it also
believed that the World Bank had a clearer mandate and more expertise in matters relating to structural
adjustment (Boughton, p. 427). 
9To  the extent that those operations reduced the burden borne by the debtor countries, the Fund’s
approach understated the banks’ contribution. But to the extent that they merely altered the form or owner-
ship of the debtors’obligations (or, with buybacks, reduced the debtors’assets), the Fund’s approach supplied
the better measure. It is impossible, however, to identify precisely the effects of the banks’operations on the
debt burden and thus to decide which calculation came closer to measuring the banks’true contribution.controls over wages, but did not attempt to reduce the public-sector deficit; and the
equally heterodox Austral Plan adopted by Argentina in June 1985. He also dis-
cusses Brazil’s sudden decision to halt interest payments on its medium- and long-
term debt to the foreign banks and the complex efforts needed to unwind it later.
Turning to Debt Reduction: 1987–1989
Nicholas Brady assumed a major role in reshaping the debt strategy weeks after
he became Secretary of the Treasury in August 1988. The plan that bears his name,
however, reflected a process that began much earlier. 
By 1987, many observers were convinced that the debt strategy had to be
more forcefully separated from the interests of commercial banks. The
most heavily indebted countries might never be able to shed their burden
without substantial relief from the contractual obligations they had
undertaken in the carefree days before 1982. Moreover, most banks had
already dodged the threat of bankruptcy, the risk of a systemic collapse
was long past, and bank creditors no longer had a clear incentive to
increase their exposure to developing countries (Boughton, p. 478). 
There was opposition to this new view in the official community, especially
from U.S. officials, and the merits of debt relief were debated vigorously within
the academic community and within the IMF. This is indeed one of the rare
instances in which Boughton describes disagreement within the institution. In
1987, he says, an intense debate began, involving members of the Research
Department and the Exchange and Trade Relations Department (ETR). Some
staff members believed that debt relief would benefit the creditors, not the
debtors, and would delay the return to normal relations between them; others
believed that the large stock of debt was an insuperable obstacle to the revival of
voluntary lending (Boughton, p. 481).10
There was, however, significant movement toward debt relief in 1987. First,
the Fund began to encourage the use of a menu of financing options, including
debt-equity swaps and exit bonds, in lieu of concerted lending. Second, several
major banks, led by Citibank, announced that they were building up their loan-loss
reserves. This step was widely seen to mean that the major banks would stiffen
their resistance to concerted lending. As Boughton points out later, however, it also
enhanced their ability to engage in debt-reducing operations (Boughton, p. 544).
Third, three heavily indebted countries, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Mexico, sought
to achieve debt relief on their own.
Late in 1986, Bolivia offered to buy back part of its debt at a deeply dis-
counted price, using cash contributed by donor governments. As the plan moved
forward, the price of Bolivian debt began to rise in the secondary market.
Earlier, it had sold at 6 cents on the U.S. dollar; on the eve of the buyback in
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10Later, he cites in particular a paper by Michael Dooley explaining why the debt overhang might
block the revival of voluntary lending. It was distributed internally in 1985 and as a working paper in 1986,
but it was not published until 1989, when it appeared in a volume edited by Frenkel, Dooley, and Wickham
(1989). The delay, he suggests, reflected the paper’s controversial conclusions (Boughton, p. 544).January 1988, it was selling at 11 cents, and this became the buyback price. As
a result, Bolivia reduced the face value of its debt by US$240 million at a cash
cost of only US$26. But the buyback had little effect on the market value of
Bolivia’s debt. The increase in the market price had offset the reduction in the
quantity of debt outstanding. Therefore, Bulow and Rogoff (1988) concluded
that Bolivia had gained nothing from the buyback. Their argument, however,
rested implicitly on the supposition that the market value of a country’s debt rep-
resents the burden of that debt, viewed from the debtor’s standpoint, and that is
debatable. The market value of a country’s debt may well reflect the creditors’
expectations about the prospects for repayment, but it would be wrong to assume
that the Bolivian government took the same probabilistic view. Most debtor
countries tried very hard to honor their obligations fully because of the risk that
default would bar future borrowing.
At about the same time that Bolivia made its offer, the Fund’s staff con-
cluded that Costa Rica needed debt reduction. Soon thereafter, Costa Rica pro-
posed what the Fund’s staff viewed as a realistic plan: the country’s whole debt
would be rescheduled over 25 years, and interest payments would be capped at
11/2 percent of Costa Rica’s GDP. But the banks’ advisory committee rejected
the plan because of the precedent it might set, and the resulting deadlock lasted
for two years. When debt relief came into vogue, however, Costa Rica made a
new proposal, and negotiations resumed. The result was not a full-fledged Brady
Plan deal of the sort described below, but it provided substantial relief. Costa
Rica bought back part of its debt at 16 cents on the dollar and converted the rest
into bearer bonds. 
At the end of 1987, Mexico announced an ambitious effort to reduce its debt.
In a deal worked out with Morgan Guaranty Bank, it offered to convert part of its
debt into long-term bonds, which would be issued at a discount determined by an
auction. The principal of the bonds would be guaranteed; the U.S. Treasury
would issue zero-coupon bonds to Mexico, which would in turn deposit them
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. There was no guarantee of the inter-
est payments, but it was hoped that Mexico’s record of on-time interest payments
would make the bonds attractive (Boughton, p. 490). The results, however, were
disappointing. Fewer than 100 banks took up the Mexican offer, and the size of
the discount, at 30 percent, was smaller than expected. But the Mexican scheme
strongly influenced the design of the Brady Plan.
In early 1988, Camdessus tried to interest U.S. officials in a plan to pro-
mote the securitization of debt, and the Fund’s staff produced a paper suggest-
ing that the Fund might seek to facilitate the “sharing of the discount” on
outstanding debt through buybacks and other transactions (Boughton, p. 483).
These efforts failed. Nevertheless, support was building for some sort of debt
relief. In the spring of 1988, Japan advanced a proposal, the Miyazawa Plan,
aimed at furnishing debt relief by forgiving interest payments on part of the
outstanding debt. It was discussed inconclusively by the G-7 governments and
the Fund’s Interim Committee at its Berlin meeting in September 1988.
Nevertheless, the Interim Committee gave convoluted endorsement to the prin-
ciple of debt reduction:
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tance in financing packages for countries undertaking adjustment, but
remains difficult to secure, the Committee agreed that the menu approach
should be broadened further, including through voluntary market-based
techniques which increase financial flows and which reduce the stock of
debt without transferring risk from private lenders to official creditors.
Soon thereafter, moreover, U.S. officials began to develop a new debt strategy,
and Brady described the main elements publicly in March 1989, shortly before
presenting the plan to the next meeting of the Interim Committee. First, commer-
cial banks should be asked to waive the sharing and negative pledge clauses in
their loan agreements, so that no individual bank would be prevented from taking
part in debt-reducing operations. Second, the IMF and World Bank should use
some of their lending to finance debt-reducing plans, and they should provide
additional financing to help debtor countries collateralize some of their interest
payments—what Mexico failed to do in 1987. Finally, the Fund should reconsider
its insistence on firm financing assurances before approving an IMF program and,
going further, should be prepared to lend to a country even when it had built up
arrears during its negotiations with its bank creditors. 
When the Executive Board discussed the new strategy, objections were raised
to the innovations that would involve the Fund directly—earmarking some of its
lending to finance debt reduction, helping to collateralize interest payments, lend-
ing into arrears, and deciding how to identify countries that should be allowed to
use Fund resources for debt-reducing operations. Boughton devotes four pages to
a contentious Board meeting that wrestled with those issues far into the night.
Thereafter, he explains how the Philippines, Mexico, and Venezuela obtained debt
relief under the Brady Plan. He then ends his history of the debt crisis by com-
pleting his account of the Fund’s relations with Argentina and Brazil.
Grading the Debt Strategy
Boughton considers several objections to the debt strategy of the 1980s and dis-
misses most of them as misplaced or exaggerated. 
Consider, first, the charge that the Fund mistook a solvency crisis for a liquid-
ity crisis and thus pursued an inappropriate time-buying strategy that had the
unfortunate effect of raising the stock of debt rather than reducing it. Boughton
trots out the usual answer—that it is very hard to distinguish clearly between the
two types of crises. In any case, he says, the problem facing the debtor countries
was neither insolvency nor illiquidity. It was instead the sudden need to mobilize
real resources in order to service their debts when they could no longer cover their
large current-account deficits by additional borrowing. The amount of domestic
adjustment required was not politically feasible in the time available.
This answer, however, raises another question:Why did the Fund underestimate
the amount of adjustment required? Boughton explains that the Fund was unduly
optimistic about the growth prospects of Latin America. Adjustment programs in the
first phase of the crisis “were predicated on forecasts of a rapid resumption of eco-
nomic growth that would gradually bring down debt service ratios to sustainable
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reflected the failure of the Fund—and of Latin American governments—to recog-
nize “the breadth of structural reform that was necessary if macroeconomic stabi-
lization was to be implemented without stunting growth.” Furthermore, strong
domestic opposition prevented some countries from implementing the programs to
which they had agreed, and the Fund could not freely acknowledge that risk when
forecasting Latin American growth (Boughton, p. 541).
It is hard to quarrel with Boughton’s explanation for the Fund’s forecasting
error. It should be noted, however, that faster growth would not have reduced the
need for substantial adjustment at the start of the debt crisis, when it was no longer
possible for the debtor countries to cover their current-account deficits by addi-
tional borrowing from the foreign banks. There was only one way to obviate the
need for sudden, substantial adjustment—much more money from the Fund. It
must also be noted that structural reform is a time-consuming process. It takes
time to implement and more time to influence economic performance. Even if the
need had been recognized, then, and the right reforms had been adopted, several
years would have elapsed before faster growth had offset the debt-raising effects
of the initial time-buying strategy. 
There was, of course, another reason to opt for a time-buying strategy, and
Boughton invokes it in his response to a different attack on the initial debt
strategy—that it was chiefly designed to make sure that banks were paid interest
on time. To be sure, the provision of new money and deferral of debt service
afforded by rescheduling helped them make their interest payments. Nevertheless,
the debtors had still to make net payments to the banks. Hence, critics suggest that
the debtors would have been better off financially if they had defaulted. Had they
defaulted, however, they could have triggered a collapse of the international bank-
ing system, which was not in their interest. Boughton stresses this point strongly
elsewhere in his book, but he slides over it here to make a different, more contro-
versial point. The adjustment required of the debtor countries was beneficial in its
own right, because “maintaining debt service is one element of a strategy to pre-
vent a slide into autarky” (Boughton, p. 542).
The record on policy reform, he says, supports this generalization. Countries
that adopt unilateralist policies on debt service, such as Peru under Alan García
and Brazil under José Sarney, tend to experience rapid economic deterioration,
and countries that delay adjustment enjoy only brief short-term benefits
(Boughton, p. 543). This argument makes me uncomfortable. It reinforces my con-
cern that the roles of financing and adjustment were being reversed in the 1980s.
Financing was used to buy adjustment in the belief that the Fund and creditor-
country governments knew what was best for the debtor countries. I would have
been happier had Boughton rested his case on the simpler assertion he made
earlier—that all concerned, including the debtors, sought rightly to prevent a col-
lapse of the banking system.
That defense, however, does not shield the Fund from another criticism—that
the Fund was too slow to espouse debt relief once it had contained the immediate
threat to the banking system. Boughton disagrees. The public stance of the Fund,
he says, was that of an intergovernmental institution. It could not get ahead of
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reminds us that Camdessus began to urge the creditor countries to consider debt
reduction in 1987 and that members of the staff, especially in the Research
Department, were early advocates of debt reduction. But the Fund must bear some
of the responsibility for the long delay. The real costs of the debt crisis would have
been far smaller if the official community had moved directly from the initial time-
buying strategy to the Brady Plan, without a four-year detour via the Baker Plan.
Boughton winds up his assessment by asking whether the adjustment strategy
was appropriate for Latin America. No one, he writes, can object to the Fund’s basic
premise that financial responsibility and stability require market-oriented policies,
low fiscal deficits, and limits on the growth of domestic credit. “The issue is
whether these prescriptions were applied rigidly in cases where they were not
strictly appropriate” (Boughton, p. 549). Questions arise, he says, with regard to
countries where the state played a large role in promoting development, so that
market-oriented stabilization policies might have been ineffective; where inflation
was due largely to structural or inertial forces, so that conventional stabilization
might have imposed high costs; and where there was little confidence in the domes-
tic currency or domestic financial system, so that the dismantling capital controls
might have been destabilizing. As the Fund worked with a model that paid little
attention to these possibilities, it had trouble devising stabilization programs that
governments could implement in the face of domestic opposition. But Boughton
claims that these problems were partially resolved during the 1980s. On the Fund’s
side, there was increasing flexibility; it even helped to design heterodox adjustment
programs, such as Argentina’s Austral Plan. On the governments’ side, the silent
revolution weakened their belief in state-dominated development and the need for
capital controls. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the debt crisis was
resolved by the Brady Plan and the resulting revival of capital inflows, which helped
to create an environment in which the debtor countries could mobilize domestic
support for the structural reforms required to catalyze self-sustaining growth. 
IV. Conditionality, Structural Adjustment, and Concessional Lending
At this point, we are halfway through Boughton’s book but more than halfway
through the space allotted for this review. Fortunately, some of the subjects he must
cover in his comprehensive institutional history need not be covered here—the two
reviews of Fund quotas in the 1980s; how the Fund borrowed to supplement its lim-
ited resources; the shrinking role of the SDR as a reserve asset and the unsuccess-
ful attempt to revive it by replacing dollar reserves with SDR-denominated claims;
the treatment of countries with large, long-lasting arrears to the Fund; the growth
of IMF membership; the Fund’s relations with the World Bank; and the internal
governance of the institution. Those stories have interesting episodes, including
some that illustrate the strong political pressures to which the Fund was often sub-
ject. (See, for example, Boughton’s discussion of the Fund’s dealings with South
Africa during the apartheid era, the problems it faced when the United States
invaded Panama, its difficult dealings with Zaïre, and the way that it dodged a
request that the Palestine Liberation Organization be granted observer status.)
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ing effects—how the Fund tightened and broadened conditionality during the
1980s, how it became heavily involved in concessional lending to the low-income
developing countries, and how it used the leverage afforded by that lending to fos-
ter structural adjustment.
Tightening and Broadening Conditionality
In the second half of the 1970s, three-quarters of the Fund’s total disbursements
involved little or no conditionality; in the first half of the 1980s, the fraction was
only two-fifths; and it continued to fall in the second half of the decade (Boughton,
p. 561). What explains this shift?
Part of the answer is simple. By the start of the 1980s, the Fund had already
committed the money it had borrowed to finance the oil facilities set up to cope
with the first oil shock, and few conditions were attached to drawings on those
facilities. Hence, countries seeking to draw on the Fund in the early 1980s had to
apply for stand-by arrangements that took them into the upper tranches of their
Fund quotas, where they faced stiffer conditions. In 1979, at the time of the sec-
ond oil shock, the Fund was under great pressure to lend more to the oil-importing
developing countries, which were hit hard by that shock, and it was widely thought
at the time that the Fund had loosened the policy conditions attached to upper-
tranche drawings so as to meet those countries’needs.11 But Boughton denies that
there was a deliberate easing of conditionality. He notes, for example, that the
Managing Director stressed the importance of conditionality in his meetings with
the staff.12 Boughton does concede, however, that conditionality “was not as
strong or effective as it later became” (Boughton p. 564).
But did conditionality become more effective? Boughton cites a staff study
of 34 countries that had entered into conditional arrangements in 1983. By 1986,
those countries had been involved in 71 stand-by or extended arrangements,
many of which had been interrupted by the countries’ failure to meet program
conditions. Only 7 of the 34 countries were deemed to be relatively close to via-
bility; 6 others would have serious problems for several more years; and the other
21 might achieve viability within five more years, but some would have to make
major policy changes (Boughton, p. 569). This sad record, however, tells us little
about the quality of conditionality. Most of the countries, Boughton notes, began
in dreadful circumstances, and some also suffered natural disasters. Furthermore,
the mid-1980s brought a hostile environment—high real interest rates, falling
commodity prices, sluggish export growth, and little if any increase in bilateral
assistance from the industrial countries. Many countries, moreover, fell far short
of meeting their policy commitments to the Fund.13 But the Fund had also to ask
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11That is what Williamson (1983) concluded, but Boughton (pp. 561–2) argues that Williamson relied
on ambiguous indirect indicators.
12 He also cites case studies contained in his book and extensive interviews with Fund staff. 
13Later, Boughton reviews research in the Fund that sought to disentangle the effects of Fund pro-
grams from the effects of the situations in which countries found themselves (Boughton, pp. 614–8). For
a review of more recent research, see Ul Haq and Khan (1998).whether adjustment programs had been poorly designed, and this was debated at
length by the Board. There were suggestions for reform, but they focused chiefly
on ways in which the Fund monitored countries’ compliance with their policy
commitments, not on the basic nature of those policy commitments. The Fund,
says Boughton, was hemmed in by the need to balance conflicting objectives:
The Fund required a borrower to develop a program to restore external
viability but encouraged it to do so in a way that would promote sustain-
able growth. The Fund wished to promote structural reforms while
respecting the social and political choices of the country. The Fund tried
to design programs that were politically feasible but that could be carried
out quickly and strongly. The Fund tried to take account of the special
circumstances facing each country while ensuring uniformity of treat-
ment. The Fund sought to collaborate with the World Bank in recom-
mending structural reforms while avoiding cross-conditionality. The
Fund had to monitor the implementation of programs but tried to mini-
mize interference with the authorities’ management of the economy.
Changing the guidelines or the procedures would do little to resolve these
conflicts (Boughton, pp. 571–2).
Although declining to rewrite the guidelines themselves, the Board intensified
and broadened conditionality. Like one of Stephen Leacock’s characters, the Fund
leapt on its horse “and rode madly off in all directions.”14
On the one hand, it increased the number of performance criteria used to mon-
itor a country’s compliance with the traditional targets of a Fund-supported pro-
gram—restraining domestic credit creation, limiting the size of the budget deficit,
and forbidding the introduction or intensification of exchange or trade restrictions.
During the 1980s, it introduced subceilings on various forms of credit creation,
limits on various forms of foreign borrowing, restrictions on the accumulation of
arrears to foreign creditors, and various rules pertaining to exchange rate policy,
such as a floor beneath the net foreign assets of the monetary authorities to keep
them from running down their reserves to defend an overvalued currency, or, alter-
natively, a rule requiring adjustments in the nominal exchange rate to offset domes-
tic inflation. In 1983, all upper-tranche IMF programs had at least five performance
criteria; by 1986, all of them had at least eight, and some had several more. There
were 15 such criteria in the 1984 Yugoslav program (Boughton, pp. 603–5).
On the other hand, the Fund introduced structural conditions into several pro-
grams, because “lending directed to countries with deep-seated structural prob-
lems could no longer be evaluated solely in terms of macroeconomic stability”
(Boughton, p. 588). The process began modestly in the early 1980s, when the staff
encouraged countries to implement liberalizing reforms but did not usually insist
that borrowing rights be conditioned on the implementation of those reforms.
Even in 1986, after the adoption of the Baker Plan, which emphasized growth-
oriented adjustment, de Larosière concluded that “the staff should continue to
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14As the Fund’s editors will surely require a citation, see Leacock (1911). Boughton cites Polak’s
(1957) more literal characterization: The restraints of the guidelines, he wrote, “have not prevented the
intensification of conditionality in every direction that the guidelines attempted to block” (quoted by
Boughton, p. 572).explore ways of monitoring structural reform outside the realm of formal perfor-
mance criteria” (Boughton, p. 589; emphasis added).
Here, Boughton draws a distinction between structural reforms of the sort that
the Fund had long favored, such as trade liberalization, and reforms more closely
identified with a growth-oriented adjustment strategy, such as supply-side mea-
sures aimed at raising saving and encouraging investment. Both the staff and the
Board had reservations about committing the Fund to the latter. Their reservations
reflected the belief that these were matters best left to the World Bank, as well as
a broader concern about the risk of real or apparent conflict between the immedi-
ate need to achieve balance-of-payments adjustment and the longer-term need to
foster economic growth. As the Fund became more deeply involved with the low-
income countries, however, it became harder to distinguish between traditional
liberalization and growth-promoting reform. Unfortunately, Boughton says very
little about the nature or number of the structural conditions that found their way
into Fund programs during the 1980s or about the extent to which countries ful-
filled those conditions. If, as Boughton says, structural reform was a principal
manifestation of the silent revolution, we need to know more about the form it
took and its impact on economic growth in the developing countries.
The tightening of conditionality had one more manifestation. The
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) was “stripped of its usefulness”
(Boughton, p. 724). The CFF was established in 1963 to furnish additional funding,
with little conditionality, to countries facing temporary shortfalls in their export
revenues because of circumstances beyond their control. It was designed chiefly for
countries that depended heavily on exports of primary products, because those
products’ prices are notoriously volatile.15 There were thereafter three liberaliza-
tions of the CFF, which raised the amount that a country could draw relative to its
IMF quota. In the case of large drawings, however, the Fund had to be satisfied that
the country was cooperating with the IMF to solve its balance-of-payments prob-
lem. Many countries met this requirement easily, because severely affected coun-
tries often sought stand-by arrangements with the Fund, and the approval of a
stand-by was deemed to be prima facie evidence of cooperation. In other cases,
however, it was harder to decide whether the requirement had been met.
Therefore, the Fund raised the bar in 1983. A country seeking to make a small
CFF drawing would be visited by a Fund mission. If, in the light of the mission’s
findings, the Fund concluded that the country’s policies were “seriously deficient,”
the country would have to take corrective action before it could draw on the CFF.
A country seeking to make a large drawing would have to convince the Fund that
its balance of payments was satisfactory, apart from the effect of the export short-
fall, or would have to qualify for a highly conditional stand-by arrangement. This
change had two effects. First, it meant that countries could no longer count on
speedy access to the CFF. Second, it meant that financing from the CFF might no
longer be truly additional to other forms of IMF financing; a country seeking a
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15The CFF was not meant exclusively for developing countries; Australia was the largest user in the
1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, use of the CFF was not limited to export shortfalls resulting from price
fluctuations. In 1982, the Fund decided that a country could draw on the CFF when it faced an export
shortfall because of a war or other political disturbance, and Argentina did that after the Falklands War. stand-by arrangement in order to qualify for a CFF drawing might find that the staff
had reduced the size of the stand-by to allow for the CFF drawing. The country
would get more money up front but might get smaller amounts thereafter.16
The 1983 decision helps to explain why there was a sharp fall in subsequent use
of the CFF, despite the huge drop in commodity prices during the 1980s. But there
were additional reasons. The collapse of commodity prices was not temporary, and
countries facing a permanent deterioration in their terms of trade had to adjust to
that shock. Furthermore, the countries most strongly affected by the collapse of
commodity prices were, in the main, low-income countries, and they were there-
fore eligible for low-cost financing from another Fund facility set up for their use.17
The Fund and the Low-Income Countries
In the 1970s, the Fund undertook to provide concessional assistance to the low-
income developing countries. In 1975, it established an Oil Facility Subsidy
Account, financed by contributions from 25 countries; it was used to reduce the
interest cost of borrowing from the Oil Facility itself. In 1976, it established a
Trust Fund, financed by some of the profits obtained from the Fund’s gold sales;
it was used to make low-interest loans. By 1981, however, the assets of the Trust
Fund had been fully committed. Furthermore, some of the loans had begun to
mature, and the rest were due to mature during the next ten years. The Fund had
therefore to make two decisions—how to replace the concessional lending that had
come from the Trust Fund, and what to do with the repayments of the Trust Fund
loans. It might, of course, have extended the life of the Trust Fund and thus turned
the repayments around by making new Trust Fund loans. But there were other
options—converting the old loans into grants, or using the repayments of Trust
Fund loans to subsidize the interest costs of ordinary drawings on the IMF.18
An interim solution was adopted in 1981. Some of the repayments of Trust Fund
loans were used to create a new subsidy account for use by low-income countries in
reducing the interest costs of drawings on the Supplementary Financing Facility
(SFF). Those interest costs were almost twice as high as the interest costs of ordi-
nary IMF drawings, because the SFF was financed with borrowed money on which
the Fund itself had to pay market interest rates. But the SFF would soon run out of
money. Hence, there was need for a new way to recycle repayments to the Trust
Fund. Two issues had to be resolved, however, before a new facility could be
designed. Which countries should have access to it? How much conditionality
should be attached to its loans? These issues were debated in 1985, at the same time
that the Fund was debating its role in the implementation of the Baker Plan.
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16This explanation paraphrases Boughton (p. 735), but he attributes the point to Polak (1991). 
17There was one further change in the CFF itself. In 1988, it was converted into the Compensatory
and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) by adding a new window designed to furnish financing to
countries beset by various unforeseen contingencies. Boughton calls the CCFF a “hydra-headed facility
of mind-numbing and self-defeating complexity” (Boughton, p. 738), and it is rarely used. 
18The story told below is a short account of a long and complex episode, but Boughton leads us
through it with remarkable clarity. I have never before understood the relationships among the several rel-
evant parts of the Fund’s intricate balance sheet. It was, of course, agreed that the new facility should be designed for the low-
income countries, and the staff proposed initially that eligibility should be con-
fined to those defined by the World Bank as “IDA-only” countries (i.e., those that
were eligible for loans from the Bank’s concessional facility, the International
Development Association, but not also eligible for conventional World Bank
loans). This proposal would have excluded China and India, the largest potential
users, which would have allowed all other countries to borrow more from the new
facility. But it was unacceptable to China and India. The problem was finally
resolved when those countries agreed voluntarily that they would refrain from
using the new facility if they were not formally precluded from doing so.
The question of conditionality was harder to resolve, because the debate about
it took place at a time when the Fund was tightening conditionality and was also
trying to decide how heavily it should emphasize structural reform. The staff of the
Fund recommended against replicating the terms of access to the Trust Fund
because those terms of access had put financing ahead of adjustment at a time
when the low-income countries were facing severe deterioration in the economic
environment. As a result, many recipients of Trust Fund loans wound up worse off
than they had been initially. Hence, the staff favored tighter conditionality. The
United States, moreover, favored a strong emphasis on structural reform. In fact,
the U.S. Executive Director, Charles Dallara, proposed that countries borrowing
from the new facility be required to adopt two-year programs aimed at macroeco-
nomic adjustment and structural reform and that the programs be devised jointly
by the Fund, the World Bank, and the countries’governments. Executive Directors
from developing countries objected strenuously; they were worried about the risk
of cross-conditionality (i.e., that one institution—the Fund or the Bank—might
withhold a loan until a country had met the requirements of the other institution).
Finally, there were disagreements about the way to monitor conditionality. 
There was therefore a compromise. The Fund and Bank would collaborate
with a country in drafting what came to be called a Policy Framework Paper.
Thereafter, however, each institution would negotiate and monitor the terms of its
own loan. The programs would emphasize structural reform, and “quantified pol-
icy benchmarks could be required as long as they were distinguished in some fash-
ion from performance criteria” (Boughton, p. 650). The new facility would thus be
called the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and it came into being in 1986.
Although the SAF got off to a slow start, Boughton concludes that it was mod-
estly successful. Many low-income countries did not apply for SAF loans or were
unable to devise adequate adjustment programs. Over its ten-year life, however, 37
of the 61 eligible countries qualified for SAF loans. Yet ten SAF programs were
abandoned before the second or third year, either because the adjustment programs
had not been fully implemented or because the country had built up arrears to the
Fund (Boughton, p. 654). Furthermore, the small size of the SAF kept it from
making a major contribution to the financing needs of the low-income countries.
Therefore, the new Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, began an ambitious
campaign to raise more money, and Boughton has high praise for him. “His goal
initially seemed hopeless to almost everyone, but not even he could have imagined
how far the quest would carry him and how fundamental it ultimately would be to
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the alleviation of the world’s worst poverty” (Boughton, p. 663).
In May 1987, Camdessus met with the heads of state and senior officials of
the G-7 countries, and they responded favorably. The communiqué issued one
month later at the Venice Summit welcomed the Managing Director’s proposal for
a “significant increase in the resources of the Structural Adjustment Facility for the
three years from January 1, 1988” (quoted by Boughton, p. 664). Even before that,
moreover, Camdessus had set a specific target—tripling the resources of the SAF
in order to establish what came to be called the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF). Boughton explains this ambitious goal:
In mid-1987, the 34 SAF-eligible countries in Africa alone faced sched-
uled repayments to the Fund totaling SDR 5.3 billion through 1990,
approximately triple the amounts that the Fund could extend to them
through the SAF over that same period. It was crucial both for the Fund
and for the indebted countries that those repayments be made. A few coun-
tries already were in arrears to the Fund, and if that problem snowballed,
then bilateral aid would dry up just when the wisdom of the Fund remain-
ing involved in sub-Saharan Africa would be increasingly called into ques-
tion. Without something close to a tripling of resources or an equivalent
amount of other forms of aid, the economic plight of many very poor
countries would be imperiled. It is no exaggeration to conclude that the
economic future of Africa was at a critical juncture (Boughton, p. 665).
At several other points, Boughton repeats a point made in this passage—that the
low-income countries needed concessional lending in order to repay the Fund. In the
case of Uganda, for example, “the money it was getting from the SAF and CFF was
not even sufficient to cover the payments that were still due on credits from the Fund”
(Boughton, p. 682). In fact, Uganda even agreed to accept the initial disbursement of
its ESAF loan in SDRs and maintain a significant balance in its SDR account in order
to facilitate timely repayments to the Fund (Boughton, p. 683). In the case of Ghana,
the 1998 ESAF loan “committed the Fund to maintain its loan exposure for several
years and freed the authorities from having either to repay large sums or to negotiate
a series of short-term arrangements” (Boughton, p. 678). The same wording, of
course, could be used to describe the effects of a MYRA. That is why, at the start of
this review, I compared the Fund’s concessional lending to the low-income countries
with its efforts to mobilize new money from commercial banks in order to stave off
default by the middle-income countries. Both were time-buying exercises, and both
were concerned with the plight of the creditor as well as the plight of the debtor.
When it came time to consider the design of the new concessional facility, the
Executive Board had to revisit some of the issues it had debated in connection with
the SAF. The management and staff, however, had already concluded that inade-
quate conditionality had impaired the effectiveness of the SAF as a vehicle for
structural adjustment. Therefore, the Board agreed that ESAF loans would be dis-
bursed semiannually, not annually like SAF loans, and that performance criteria
would be used to monitor compliance with both macroeconomic and structural
conditions. But it was proving hard to raise the necessary money. The United
States was reluctant to contribute, because it wanted to concentrate initially on
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ment of the IDA. In the end, the Board decided to create two accounts—a Loan
Account to receive loans from donor countries that would then be lent to low-
income countries and a Subsidy Account to receive grants from donor countries
that would then be passed on to low-income countries as interest subsidies. The
United States contributed to the Subsidy Account, along with 23 other countries,
but not to the Loan Account. The ESAF made its first loan in 1988 and became the
principal source of concessional credit from the IMF. In fact, it would become the
only source of IMF financing for the low-income developing countries.
How does Boughton assess the performance of the ESAF? It was, he says, “des-
tined to become a success story of assistance to desperately poor countries in an era
when such success was elusive.” Nearly 40 low-income countries would receive
ESAF credits and “would have the opportunity to establish a track record of eco-
nomic progress that would bring in bilateral assistance and in some cases private cap-
ital flows and direct investment” (Boughton, p. 684). Boughton concedes that donor
countries may have reduced their contributions to the replenishment of the IDA, but
says that most of them tried to avoid offsetting reductions in bilateral aid programs.
Yet Boughton does not confront the issue raised by his own history—whether the
recipients of ESAF loans would have been better off if the money supplied by the
donor countries had been used to repay directly the recipients’ debts to the Fund.
Presumably, Boughton would say “no” because he believes that ESAF loans have
brought important reforms in the borrowing countries, whereas outright debt relief
might not have done that, even if countries were made to meet demanding precondi-
tions before they could qualify for debt relief. We may not know the answer to this
question, however, until we can assess the long-term effects of the current HIPC ini-
tiative, which aims to reduce the debt burdens of the heavily indebted poor countries.
It is not too early, however, to raise questions about the Fund’s ambitious
attempt to force the pace of structural reform in developing countries and
Boughton’s strong endorsement of it. I have argued elsewhere (Kenen, 2001) that
the Fund’s insistence on far-reaching reform during the Asian crisis of the 1990s
may have made the crisis worse by convincing panicky creditors that the crisis-
stricken countries could not begin to recover unless they dealt swiftly and deci-
sively with all of their deep-seated problems. The Fund was right to insist that
some things be done promptly. Insolvent banks had to be closed or recapitalized,
and the problem of corporate debt had to be addressed although it could not be
solved quickly. The Fund went too far, however, by insisting on many other
reforms, such as removing restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic
banks, abolishing domestic monopolies, and liberalizing trade. Reforms of that
sort could do little in the short run to reduce the cost or duration of the Asian cri-
sis, and we cannot claim to know what they could do in the long run to foster the
further success of the Asian economies. Governments cannot be expected to take
ownership of policies that are not clearly efficacious. 
Fortunately, a not-so-silent reformation has followed the silent revolution.
Under the recent revision of the Fund’s Guidelines for Conditionality, policy
conditions will be formulated parsimoniously and will normally focus on macro-
economic variables and structural measures that are within the Fund’s core areas
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rate policies; and financial system issues. Excursions into other policy domains
will not occur unless they are critically important. This is surely the right way to
refocus the Fund. 
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